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WHAT DETERMINES DIFFERENCES 






This study applies parametric distance functions to estimate the efficiency of foreign banks in 
Australia, and subsequently employs extreme bounds analysis to establish the determinants of 
foreign bank efficiency that are robust to model specification. The limited global advantage 
hypothesis of Berger et al (2000) is supported. Following clients is found to reduce the 
efficiency of the profit-creation process. The market share of the incumbent banks acts as a 
barrier to entry to efficiency in the retail market, with acquisition of a domestic bank reducing 
this effect. Internet-based bank product delivery reduces the efficiency of profit creation in the 
initial phases of operation, and parent profits do not improve efficiency in the host market. 
JEL Code: G15, G21, C15, C52. 
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1. Introduction 
To date it has been largely found that foreign banks are less efficient than domestic 
banks (Berger et al, 2000). The central focus of this study is aimed at addressing the 
deeper question of “What factors determine differences in multinational bank 
efficiency?” In order to address this question, this study will apply parametric 
distance functions to Australian banking and thus also extend the previous work of 
Sturm and Williams (2004). Sturm and Williams (2004) found that foreign banks in 
Australia were more efficient than domestic banks, particularly due to superior scale 
efficiency. Given the previous results surveyed in Berger et al (2000), as well as the 
results of Sturm and Williams (2004), the Australian case provides a valuable 
opportunity to extend the bank efficiency literature. This study will expand the 
previous research by establishing those factors that determine differences in foreign 
bank efficiency in the host market. This will provide a detailed test of the limited form 
of the global advantage hypothesis of Berger et al (2000). Studies such as those by 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) and Beccalli (2004) have illustrated that cross-
border differences in efficiency are affected by differences in environmental 
variables. This study will consider the impact of home nation and parent bank 
characteristics upon foreign bank efficiency in the host nation, thus adding a new 
perspective to the multinational bank efficiency literature. 
A feature of this study is that foreign bank efficiency estimates will be drawn from a 
comparison of domestic banks in Australia with foreign banks in Australia, thus 
enabling this study to determine those factors which influence differences in 
efficiency for banks operating multinationally. The model of foreign bank efficiency 
in Australia that will be tested is based upon the previous work of Williams (2003, 
1998a, 1998b), with some appropriate modifications due to the differences in research 
question being addressed. 
The results of this study will be of benefit to bank managers considering strategic 
objectives for offshore expansion, in particular determination of the appropriate host 
nations. Credit raters will find results of this study useful to provide a benchmark for 
assessing offshore strategies of banks undergoing ratings reviews, while regulators of 
banking systems will find these results informative when considering the appropriate 
regulatory responses to multinational bank entry into their country. 3 
This study applies parametric distance functions (Coelli and Perelman, 1999) to 
obtain estimates of foreign bank efficiency. Factors determining foreign bank 
efficiency will be established by the application of extreme bounds analysis (Levine 
and Renelt, 1992), as modified by Sala–i–Martin (1997). This study finds that the 
limited global advantage hypothesis of Berger et al (2000) applies in the Australian 
context. Little evidence was found to support the application of defensive expansion 
theory. However, the processing of investment income flows acts to increase profit 
creation efficiency, but reduces the efficiency of transformation of physical inputs 
into outputs.  The domination of the Australian market by the Big Four banks acts as a 
barrier to entry, reducing efficiency, particularly in the retail market, consistent with 
Williams (2003). This indicates that foreign banks competing with the incumbent 
banks over-used inputs in order to contest with the incumbent banks in terms of 
service delivery. However, there is some evidence to suggest that acquisition of a 
domestic bank active in retail banking reduces this barrier to entry. The results also 
suggest that internet-based banking delivery does not increase the efficiency of the 
profit creation process, at least in the initial phases of operation, and that parent 
profitability does not improve host market efficiency. 
 
2. Literature review 
In addressing the research question posed by this study, two areas of research 
endeavor are relevant, (i) those that consider the efficiency of foreign banks in the 
host nation, and (ii) those that consider foreign bank efficiency in Australia. 
2.1. The efficiency of foreign banks in the host nation 
The recent survey by Berger et al (2000) concluded that foreign banks are less 
efficient than the host nation financial institutions. This conclusion is the outcome of 
studies employing several different efficiency estimation methods as well as using 
several different samples. Hasan and Hunter (1996) and Mahajan et al (1996) both 
found foreign banks in the United States had lower cost efficiency, while De Young 
and Nolle (1996) found similar results for foreign bank profit efficiency. Berger et al 
(2000) considered both cost and profit efficiency of foreign banks in five different 
nations (France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States) and 
found foreign banks to be less cost and profit efficient than domestic banks on 4 
average. However, Berger et al (2000) also found that for three of the five nations 
considered, banks from the United States were on average more efficient than 
domestic banks. Miller and Parkhe (2002) considered fourteen different host nations, 
employing stochastic frontier estimation of an alternative profit function, also finding 
domestic banks to be more efficient than foreign banks. In considering these results 
Berger et al (2000) proposed two alternative hypotheses, (i) the home field advantage 
hypothesis and (ii) the global advantage hypothesis. Under the home field advantage, 
the liability of foreignness
1 imposes costs on foreign banks such that the domestic 
banks are more efficient than foreign banks. The alternative hypothesis of global 
advantage has two forms, the general form and the limited form. Under the general 
form of the global advantage hypothesis, efficient foreign banks from a variety of 
nations are able to operate across national borders at higher levels of efficiency than 
domestic banks. The main body of empirical evidence to date has rejected this 
hypothesis, as did Berger et al (2000). The limited form of the global advantage 
hypothesis proposes that banks from some nations are able to overcome the costs 
imposed by the liability of foreignness due to nation-specific factors. 
 Berger  et al (2000) found the limited form of the global advantage hypothesis 
supported by the finding that banks from the United States were more efficient than 
domestic banks in three of five host nations. Beccalli (2004) also found that UK 
investment firms were more efficient than foreign investment firms in the UK, while 
also confirming the limited global advantage for both UK and Japanese investment 
firms operating in Italy, and Japanese investment firms in the UK. In contrast to 
Berger et al (2000) for banks, Beccalli (2004) found US investment firms to be less 
efficient than domestic investment firms. A recent study by Sturm and Williams 
(2004) considered foreign banks in Australia, and their results are also suggestive of 
the limited form of the global advantage hypothesis, finding that foreign banks in 
Australia were, on average more efficient than domestic banks. Sturm and Williams 
(2004) suggested that the process that rationed foreign bank licences in Australia 
                                                 
1 The liability of foreignness are the costs borne by banks operating away from their home 
market, such costs include monitoring, staff turnover, diseconomies of scale for retail 
operations, and factors such as culture, language and market structure acting as barriers to 
entry (Miller and Parkhe, 2002). 5 
during deregulation selected banks possessing attributes that enabled these banks to 
overcome the liability of foreignness. Responding to the results of these recent 
studies, this research will determine those factors that act as a source of limited global 
advantage in determining bank efficiency. 
2.2. Foreign Bank efficiency in Australia 
There have been several studies that have considered bank efficiency in Australia, 
with the results to date surveyed by Sturm and Williams (2004).
2 Of these studies, two 
have compared foreign and domestic bank efficiency. Sathye (2001) applied Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to a sample of 29 banks operating in Australia in 1996 
(17 domestic banks and 12 foreign banks) and concluded that there were no 
significant differences between domestic and foreign banks. Sturm and Williams 
(2004) employed a wider ranging study both in terms of method and sample, 
considering thirty-nine banks between 1998 and 2001, with nineteen foreign banks 
and twenty domestic banks. The domestic banks were categorized as Big Four to 
represent the four large banks that dominate the Australian banking system in terms of 
size and Other Domestic banks to reflect the smaller, mainly regional and retail banks. 
Sturm and Williams (2004) employed non-parametric methods (DEA and Malmquist 
Indices) as well as stochastic frontier estimation. The results presented by Sturm and 
Williams (2004) emphasised the non-parametric estimation, with the stochastic 
frontier estimates used to confirm the conclusions drawn from DEA and Malmquist 
Index analysis. It was concluded that foreign banks were more efficient than domestic 
banks mainly due to superior scale efficiency. It was suggested that these results 
support the limited form of the global advantage hypothesis. Sturm and Williams 
(2004) suggested that the process of bank licence allocation that occurred during the 
early phases of Australian bank deregulation selected those banks with characteristics 
allowing them to overcome the liability of foreignness. It was concluded that diversity 
of bank types operating in a particular nation are an important source of ongoing 
innovation and efficiency. This paper will extend this previous study by determining 
which foreign bank characteristics are the sources of these valuable effects. 
                                                 
2 A recent study by Neal (2004) included both domestic and foreign banks in the sample, but 
did not directly compare domestic and foreign banks. The sample in Neal (2004) is smaller 
than that employed by Sturm and Williams (2004). 6 
3. Method 
3.1.  Intermediation approach 
Consistent with the previous literature in this area, this study will apply the 
intermediation approach to bank production (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Berger and 
Mester, 1997). In the intermediation approach a bank is viewed as employing inputs 
such as deposits, staff and equity to produce outputs such as loans and off balance 
sheet items. As discussed by Berger et al (1993), results of efficiency estimates can be 
sensitive to the specification of inputs and outputs. In order to control for this effect it 
is intended to specify several different combinations of inputs and outputs. This will 
commence from a parsimonious balance sheet specification, in which banks use 
equity, employees and deposits to produce loans and off balance items (Model 1), as 
applied by Allen and Rai (1996), Chang et al (1998) and Sturm and Williams (2004). 
Following this base-line approach, additional outputs will be specified, in which loans 
are divided into retail components (Model 1a), and additional wholesale activity is 
included (Model 1b), to determine if this sensitivity analysis produces any further 
insight. Further sensitivity analysis will be conducted by applying an income-based 
specification of inputs and outputs as applied by Avkiran (1999 and 2000) and Sturm 
and Williams (2004) (Model 2). The income-based specification will consider inputs 
as interest expenses and non-interest expenses, while outputs will be specified as net 
interest income and non-interest income. Table 1 provides a summary of these 
models. The changes in model specification will result in some changes in sample 
composition due to data availability. 7 
Table 1: Summary of Models Employed 
 Inputs  Outputs
Model 1 (i) employees, (i) loans,
(ii) deposits and borrowed funds, (ii) off balance sheet activity.
(iii) equity capital.
Model 1a (i) employees, (i) loans less housing loans,
(retail model) (ii) deposits, (ii) housing loans,
(iii) equity capital. (iii) off balance sheet 
Model 1b (i) employees, (i) loans,
(wholesale model) (ii) deposits, (ii) investments,
(iii) equity capital. (iii) off balance sheet 
Model 2 (i) interest expenses, (i) net interest income,
(revenue model) (ii) non-interest expenses. (ii) non-interest income.  
 
3.2.  Technique 
As this data set does not contain input or output prices for all banks, the parametric 
input-distance function proposed by Coelli and Perelman (1999) will be applied. This 
approach allows maximum likelihood estimation of a translog function using multiple 
outputs and inputs. We allow a time trend to influence the efficiency of the banks to 
reflect the impact of technology shifts and other time-dependent effects. 
Following Coelli and Perelman (1999), to define an input-distance function we begin 
by defining the production technology of the bank using the input set,  () Ly, which 
represents the set of all input vectors,  + ∈
K x R , which can produce the output vector, 
+ ∈
M y R . That is,  
(1)  () { } can produce + =∈ : .
K Ly x R x y  
We assume that the technology satisfies the axioms listed in Färe and Primont (1995).  
The input-distance function is then defined on the input set,  ( ) L y , as  
(2)  () ()( ) { } max ,= : /∈ . Dxy x Ly θθ  
() , Dxy is non-decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous and concave in x, and 
decreasing in  y . The distance function,  ( ) , Dxy, will take a value which is greater 8 
than or equal to one if the input vector,  x, is an element of the feasible input set, 
() Ly. That is,  ( ) 1 ,≥ Dxy  if  ( ) ∈ x Ly. Furthermore, the distance function will take a 
value of unity if x is located on the inner boundary of the input set.  
The translog input distance function for the case of M  outputs and K  inputs is 







ln ln ln ln
2




























Symmetry implies  = mn nm α α  and  = kl lk β β . The restrictions required for homogeneity 
of degree  1 +  in inputs are  
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Lovell at al. (1994) use these homogeneity restrictions to transform the above 
equation into a form that can be estimated using ordinary least squares or maximum 
likelihood. Homogeneity in inputs implies that  ( ) ( ) , =, Dx y D x y ωω , for any  0 > ω . 
Hence, if we arbitrarily choose one of the inputs, such as the K th input, and set 
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Also observe that if we wish to impose constant returns to scale upon this input 
distance function, we must impose homogeneity of degree  1 −  in outputs. This 
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By noting that  ( ) () ( ) ln ln ln /= − K K Dx D x  and only imposing homogeneity of degree 
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where  ln = qE Q C P ,  ln = lL A O R  (output 1),  ln = oO B S A  (output 2),  ln
∗ = EMPL
EQCP e , 
ln
∗ = DABF
EQCP a , and  ln = dD . With EQCP = Equity Capital; LAOR = Loans; OBSA = 
Off Balance Sheet Activity; EMPL = Employee Numbers; DABF = Deposits. 
Using the dependent variable q and the 14 explanatory variables (not including d ) 
which follow from the above equation, we have used FRONTIER (Version 4.1) to 
estimate the frontier and the implied technical efficiency.  
The FRONTIER program follows a three-step procedure in estimating the maximum 
likelihood estimates of the parameters of a stochastic frontier production function. 
The three steps are:  
1.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the function are obtained. All 
coefficient estimates with the exception of the intercept will be unbiased. 
2.  A two-phase grid search of γ  is conducted, with the coefficient parameters 
(except the intercept) set to the OLS values and the intercept and 
2 σ  
parameters adjusted according to the corrected ordinary least squares formula 
presented in Coelli (1995). Any other parameters are set to zero in this grid 
search.  
3.  The values selected in the grid search are used as starting values in an iterative 
procedure (using the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell Quasi-Newton method) to 
obtain the final maximum likelihood estimates.  
Imposing constant returns to scale (i.e. also impose homogeneity of degree  1 −  in 
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The remaining parameters  q β ,  eq β ,  aq β ,  lq δ ,  oq δ ,  o α ,  oe δ  and  oa δ  can be calculated 
using the homogeneity restrictions.  
Homogeneity of degree  1 +  in inputs:  
(9)  1 = −− ; = −−; = −−; qe a e q e e e a a q e a a a β ββ β β ββ β β 
(10)  =− − ; =− − . lq le la oq oe oa δ δδ δ δδ  
Homogeneity of degree  1 −  in outputs:  
(11) 1 =− − ; =− ; =− . o l oe le oa la α αδ δ δ δ  
The model we use to estimate the above specification is taken from Battese and Coelli 
(1995) and may be expressed as:  
(12)  ( ) =+−, it it it it YXV U 
where  1 =, , i… N , 1 =, , t… T ,  it Y  equals the dependent variable ( it q  or () −
it qo),  it X  
is the set of (14 or 11) explanatory variables. The  it V  are random variables which are 




⎝⎠ , V N σ , and independent of the  it U  which are non-negative 
random variables which are assumed to account for technical inefficiency in 




⎝⎠ , it U Nmσ  distribution. Furthermore,  
(13)  0 =+, it t mt η η  
where t is a time trend which may influence the efficiency of a firm, and  0 η  and  t η  
(labelled  delta 0 and delta 1 in FRONTIER’s output file) are parameters to be 
estimated.  11 
We use the parameterisation from Battese and Corra (1977), replacing 
2
V σ  and 
2
U σ  
with 






σ σ γ . The log-likelihood function of this model is 
presented in the appendix in Battese and Coelli (1993). 
3 
 
3.3.  Second-stage model 
Williams (2003) developed a model of factors determining multinational bank profits 
in the host nation. This model will be applied to the estimates of bank efficiency, as 
an alternative measure of bank performance, to determine if those factors that 
determine multinational bank profits in the host nation also determine multinational 
bank efficiency in the host nation. This approach will extend Berger et al (2000), by 
determining whether differences in multinational bank efficiency are due to host 
nation effects (such as economic growth or trade patterns), parent bank effects (such 
as parent size and profitability), or host market effects (such as market concentration). 
In order to address this question adequately, estimates of multinational bank 
efficiency must be drawn from frontier estimation that includes domestic (host nation) 
banks in the sample. These estimates will be then used as dependent variables in 
second stage regressions to establish which factors drawn from the model employed 
by Williams (2003) are relevant to the determination of bank efficiency. 
While efficiency may not always translate into profitability due to factors such as 
asset quality and the impact of competitive pricing, it would be expected a priori that 
efficient banks are generally more profitable. Thus, factors that determine differences 
in bank profits, as modeled by Williams (2003) would be a relevant starting point to 
model differences in observed bank efficiency. Following the advice provided by 
Coelli  et al (1998, p 171) if the variables used as inputs and outputs are highly 
correlated with the variables used in the second step regressions, then any results from 
second step regressions are potentially biased. As this study intends to use both 
domestic and multinational factors to explain differences in estimated bank efficiency, 
this issue should be somewhat ameliorated. Further, some variables employed by 
Williams (2003) will be omitted from the second stage regressions as they will have 
                                                 
3 The exposition of Models 1a, 1b and 2 are available from the authors on request. 12 
been used as either inputs or outputs in the estimation of the parametric distance 
functions from which the efficiency estimates are drawn. It is intended that these 
regressions will determine which factors result in differences in observed 
multinational bank efficiency. 
Williams (2003) developed and tested a model of multinational bank profits that 
reflected both domestic and multinational determinants of bank profits. It was found 
that a model which combines elements drawn from both the domestic bank profits 
literature and the multinational banking literature resulted in a small increase in 
explanatory power as compared to a purely multinational model. This small increase 
in explanatory power did, however, generate additional insights into the policy and 
strategic decisions of multinational banks operating in Australia. Of particular note 
was the negative impact competitor market share had upon foreign bank profits. 
Williams (2003) also indicated that there was a need for further research that 
considered foreign bank efficiency. 
3.3.1. Variables for second-stage regression 
Williams (2003) employed competitor market share to measure the degree of host 
market competition confronting foreign banks in the host market. Competitor market 
share was specified as the market share of the four largest banks plus the market share 
of all other banks in the host market of the same nationality. Market share was defined 
in terms of assets. It was argued that the dominance of the Australian market by the 
four major banks (Big 4) acted as a barrier to entry with the large incumbent banks 
acting as local monopolists. Such dominance required the foreign banks to be price 
competitive, and so reducing their observed profits. Further, consistent with the 
defensive expansion hypothesis that banks follow their clients abroad (Williams, 
2002), the next most important level of competition faced by foreign banks would be 
those banks from the same nation also seeking the same client base as beachhead into 
the host nation (Fieleke, 1977), thus the competition offered by foreign banks of the 
same nationality is also relevant to measure the level of barrier to entry faced by 
foreign banks in Australia.  
Williams (2003) found that foreign banks profits were negatively related to 
competitor market share, however this may not necessarily also apply for efficiency. 
Such competition may result in increased efficiency in the host market, which due to 13 
the level of competition in pricing, particularly in the wholesale market, may not be 
reflected in higher foreign bank profit, despite higher efficiency. Foreign banks are 
particularly active in the wholesale market, (Williams, 2003), thus, efficiency in a 
competitive market may not necessarily result in increased profits. 
While Williams (2003) did not find foreign bank profits in Australia to have a 
significant relationship with their parent profitability, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001, p. 
2326) have argued that parent profitability acts as one possible measure of parent 
efficiency. Those banks operating multinationally possess skills and attributes that 
enable them to operate in the host market and so potentially overcome the liabilities of 
foreignness. If a foreign banks’ parent is more efficient in the home market this 
provides a possible source of a comparative advantage for the bank to apply in the 
host market and so increase its efficiency in the host market (Williams, 1997). Given 
the argument above it is possible that foreign bank parent efficiency, as measured by 
profitability does not increase foreign bank profits in the host market, but does 
increase foreign bank efficiency. This study will use both Home Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Home Net Interest Margins (NIM) to measure parent Profits. 
The defensive expansion hypothesis considers that banks expand offshore to defend 
their existing bank-client relationship (Brimmer and Dahl, 1975, Williams, 2002). As 
surveyed by Williams (2002) there is considerable evidence advanced to support this 
hypothesis in terms of bank size, while the evidence supporting this hypothesis in 
terms of bank profits is less clear-cut. In the Australian case Williams (1996, 1998a, 
1998b, 2003) has found little support for a significant relationship between foreign 
bank profits and defensive expansion measures such as investments, exports or 
bilateral trade (imports plus exports). Following the argument of Williams (2002) that 
portfolio investment does not necessarily require a physical presence, while direct 
investment is more closely aligned with the need for a physical presence, direct 
investment (excluding portfolio investment) will be used to measure investments from 
the foreign bank’s home nation into Australia. As the evidence has strongly supported 
the application of the defensive expansion hypothesis to foreign bank size, both 
internationally and in Australia, it is possible that foreign banks that follow their 
clients abroad benefit from increased size and thus, possibly, increased efficiency, but 
that this outcome is not reflected in reported profits. 14 
Parent size has been found to have an important role in determining the size of foreign 
banks in the host nation (Cho, 1985, Williams 1998a and 1998b). However, little 
evidence has been found to suggest a relationship between parent size and profits in 
the host nation. Tschoegl (2003) has suggested that the largest bank in each nation is 
the most likely candidate for successful offshore expansion, while smaller banks have 
reduced host nation success. This study will consider two measures of parent size, log 
of assets (measured in AUD) and log of equity (in AUD), to determine if parent size 
impacts upon measured foreign bank efficiency in the host market. As it is possible 
that exchange rate effects impact upon the measurement of parent size, this study will 
translate the parent size measures into Australian dollars (AUD) using two different 
exchange rates; (i) the average exchange rate for the relevant financial year; and (ii) 
the average exchange rate for the relevant balance month. 
Increased home nation growth has been argued by Moshirian (2001) and Williams 
(2003) to reduce the attractiveness of offshore investment. Investing offshore when 
the domestic market is experiencing rapid growth results in the bank bearing an 
opportunity cost. Thus, the bank that chooses to invest offshore is bearing an 
opportunity cost of reduced home market investment. This opportunity cost will be 
measured in this case by the growth rate of the home nation GDP. Williams (2003) 
found that foreign bank profits in Australia were a positive function of home nation 
GDP growth. It was suggested by Williams (2003) that this result reflected a 
substitution effect between international banking (offshore activity conducted from 
the home market) and multinational banking (offshore activity conducted offshore). 
This study will consider if home nation GDP growth has any impact upon efficiency 
in the host market. 
Nations with higher GDP per capita have more efficient domestic financial systems 
(Buch and DeLong, 2004) and so are more likely to be able to export efficient 
practices, consistent with the previous discussion of parent bank profits. Further, Buch 
and DeLong (2004) argued that nations with higher levels of economic development 
as represented by GDP per capita are also more likely to acquire banks in other 
nations. They found that banks in nations with lower GDP per capita are more likely 
to be targets in cross-border mergers. It was concluded that banks from developed 
nations are more likely to act as acquirers in cross-border mergers and this was 
presumed to be due to their higher efficiency. This study will determine if higher 15 
home market financial development (as measured by GDP per capita) results in higher 
efficiency in the host market. 
Due to the liability of foreignness, domestic incumbents are likely to have advantages 
over the new foreign entrants. To overcome this disadvantage, foreign banks must 
possess compensating advantages. One possible advantage is experience in operating 
in the host market. Tschoegl (1982) suggested that experience has two dimensions; (i) 
generic experience of cross border operations and, (ii) specific experience of 
operating in the particular nation. Williams (1996) found that Japanese bank size in 
Australia was a positive non-linear function of time in Australia. However, the larger 
studies of Williams (1998a and 1998b) found no evidence that experience in the host 
nation impacted upon either profits or size. It is possible that host nation experience 
impacts upon efficiency, while not affecting foreign bank profits or size. This study 
will measure experience in the host market as the number of years between the sample 
year and the year of first transaction based activity.
4  
 
3.3.2. Control Variables 
The limited form of the global advantage hypothesis considers that banks from some 
nations are able to overcome the liability of foreignness due to nation specific factors 
(Berger et al, 2000). It is possible that the nation specific factors employed in this 
model do not capture all the dimensions of nation-specific factors that allow a bank to 
overcome the liability of foreignness. Thus dummy variables for nationality will be 
included in the model to capture any exogenous nationality effects not otherwise 
controlled for and to allow comparison with the results of Williams (2003, 1998a and 
1998b). A further dummy variable will be included to represent commonality of 
national language. Tschoegl (2003) and Buch and DeLong (2004) have argued that if 
the home and host nation share a common language this can act as a measure of 
reduced cultural distance so reducing the liability of foreignness. Thus a dummy 
variable will be included for all foreign banks whose home nation has English as a 
                                                 
4 Measures of generic international experience such as numbers of countries of operation and 
Euromarket activity tend to be highly correlated with parent size measures (Cho, 1985); size 
measures are already included in this model. 16 
primary language. It is also possible that the credit rating of the parent bank may 
reflect factors impacting upon efficiency in the host nation. Thus a measure reflecting 
the ranked credit rating of the parent bank will also be included in the analysis.
5 
 
3.4. Extreme Bounds Analysis and Model Uncertainty 
In this case the economic theory discussed above does not provide the researcher with 
a strong framework or prior evidence regarding factors determining foreign bank 
efficiency. The evidence discussed above was drawn mainly from the literature 
considering foreign bank size or profits, not efficiency. While this evidence provides a 
theoretical background to the choice of relevant variables, it does not directly address 
the research question posed in this paper. This issue will be dealt with by the 
application of extreme bounds analysis (Leamer, 1983; Levine and Renelt, 1992) to 
allow the examination of the robustness of the variables of interest to model 
specification (de Haan and Sturm, 2000). As suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997) the 
test applied under extreme bounds analysis are too strong for any variable to pass, and 
as such the distribution of the estimated coefficients should be examined. 
In extreme bounds analysis, an equation of the following general form is estimated: 
(14)  it it it it it u Z F M Y + + + = γ β α , 
where  it Y  is the dependent variable, i.e. in this case measured foreign bank efficiency, 
it M  a vector of standard explanatory variables drawn from the literature,  it F  the 
explanatory variable of interest,  it Z  a vector of up to three (Levine and Renelt, 1992) 
possible additional explanatory variables, and  it u  the usual error term. 
This approach commences with a vector of explanatory variables that are always 
significant, a variable F  is then added to the model and an additional vector, Z , of 
up to three additional variables are then added to the model. The vector Z  is based 
upon economic theory as being suggested by theory as being related to Y , with, 
                                                 
5 The ranked credit rating will consider all banks rated as AAA as having a rank of 1, if there 
are 3 banks with a AAA rating, then the bank with the next lowest rating (Aa1) will be ranked 
4, and so forth. 17 
however, less conclusive empirical support than the vector M . The process of 
respecifying the vector Z  continues until all possible combinations of the Z  vector 
have been exhausted. From this process a vector of the estimated β coefficients and 
their associated standard errors are obtained. The lowest value minus twice its 
standard deviation is calculated, as is the highest value plus twice its estimated 
standard deviation. The extreme bounds test considers these to be the highest and 
lowest observed β.   If these values encompass both positive and negative values then 
it is concluded that the variable F  is not robustly related to Y  (Levine and Renelt, 
1992). As argued, however, by Temple (2000), it is rare for any model to dominate all 
alternatives in all dimensions. Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that this approach sets too 
rigid a threshold and instead the distribution of the estimated β vector and its 
associated standard deviation should be considered. It is suggested, instead, that if 
90% of the estimated β coefficients are significantly different from zero at the five 
percent significance level, then the variable F  should be considered as being strongly 
correlated with the dependent variable (Sturm and de Haan, 2005). Further, the 
cumulative distribution function of β should also be considered. As stated by Sala-i-
Martin (1997), if a large percentage of the estimated β lie on one side of zero, it is 
more likely to be correlated with Y  than a variable with a far smaller percentage of its 
estimated coefficients lying to one side of zero. Thus this paper will use the approach 
of Sala-i-Martin, as applied by de Haan and Sturm (2000) and Sturm and de Haan 
(2005). Thus we will report not only the extreme bounds for each parameter, but also 
the unweighted parameter estimate of the β and its unweighted standard deviation, as 
well as the unweighted cumulative distribution function and the percent of the 
estimated β significant at the five percent level. 
Unlike the situation in Sala-i-Martin (1997), this study is not able to refer to a prior 
stream of research into the determinants of foreign bank efficiency to establish those 
variables that should comprise the M  vector; this study is the first that these authors 
are aware that models the determinants of foreign bank efficiency. Thus the basic 
model will commence with an intercept only and a robust model will be developed 
from that point. 
Due to the differences in both research question and methodology, the second stage 
regressions employed in this study will differ from the models employed by Williams 18 
(2003). As discussed by Coelli et al (1998, p 171), if the input and output variables 
are highly correlated with the explanatory variables used in the second stage 
regressions, then the results for the secondary regression are potentially biased. As 
this study uses as inputs or outputs variables that have been used by Williams (2003) 
as explanatory variables (or are expected to be highly correlated with inputs or 
outputs), there have been some changes to the models of Williams (2003). These 
changes particularly affect the model that adds domestic market factors to the 
multinational market as many of the domestic market factors included in Williams 
(2003) are endogenous to the models used to generate the efficiency estimates. 
 
3.5.  Sample 
This study will consider banks operating in Australia between 1988 and 2001. The 
banks in the sample will be categorized as Big 4, Other Domestic and Foreign, 
following Sturm and Williams (2004). The primary data source is the bank’s annual 
reports with additional details being obtained from the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) Bulletin and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). Details 
regarding foreign bank parents were obtained from Moody’s Credit Opinions: 
Financial Institutions. Foreign bank home nation trade data was obtained from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics and the parent nation data was sourced from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics. 
The characteristics of the sample for each model are listed in Table 2, while Table 3 
has the descriptive statistics of the inputs and outputs to be used in the estimation of 
bank efficiency. All values in Table 3 are in thousands of Australian dollars, except 
for employee numbers. Table 3 shows the Foreign banks are proportionately more 
active in off balance sheet financing, the Other Domestic banks are proportionately 
more active in housing finance, unsurprisingly, the Big Four banks are the largest. It 
should be noted that some of the foreign banks have no housing loans. This is a 
strategic choice by these banks not to conduct this type of financing; and as such is a 19 
valid output decision. As this model is estimated in logarithmic form; 1 was added to 
all values to allow logarithms to be taken of all values.
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1988 2 3 13 18 2136 23 1 3 1 8 487 1 9
1989 3 8 15 26 3 4 12 19 3 8 15 26 4 9 8 21
1990 3 8 13 24 3 8 13 24 3 8 13 24 4 10 7 21
1991 4 9 13 26 4 9 13 26 4 9 13 26 4 10 7 21
1992 4 9 12 25 4 9 12 25 4 9 12 25 4 10 7 21
1993 4 9 11 24 4 9 11 24 4 9 11 24 4 12 7 23
1994 4 10 11 25 4 10 11 25 4 10 11 25 4 10 7 21
1995 4 10 9 23 4 10 9 23 4 10 9 23 4 11 5 20
1996 4 10 6 20 4 10 6 20 4 10 6 20 4 11 4 19
1997 4 7 6 17 4 7 6 17 4 7 6 17 4 8 4 16
1998 4 5 4 13 4 5 4 13 4 5 4 13 4 9 5 18
1999 4 5 5 14 4 5 5 14 4 5 5 14 4 7 6 17
2000 4 5 4 13 4 5 4 13 4 5 4 13 4 8 7 19
2001 4 5 3 12 4 5 3 12 4 5 3 12 4 8 4 16
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1b Model 1a
 
Note: See Table 1 for model descriptions. 
 
                                                 
6 In the case of foreign banks, restructures of the Australian banks resulted in that bank being 
treated as a new bank, as in the case of the merger of Bank of Tokyo and Mitsubishi Bank in 
Japan to result in the establishment of Bank of Tokyo/Mitsubishi Australia. 20 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: All banks   Obs Mean Std. Error MinimumMaximum
Deposits 334 16,627,473 31,670,293 2,607 191,000,000
Employees 341 7,497 14,146 43 50,366
Housing loans 361 4,080,611 7,811,910 0 47,679,000
Loans 334 17,246,386 33,448,542 188,471 208,000,000
Non-interest income 321 494,091 961,216 1,678 6,522,999
Off balance sheet activity 304 7,925,736 17,324,183 0 96,141,000
Equity capital 364 1,699,438 3,484,645 21,999 23,556,999
Interest income 324 2,030,574 3,564,893 31,235 19,918,999
Interest expense 322 1,324,700 2,272,543 6,150 12,958,999
Investments 334 3,599,697 6,158,195 2,700 45,165,999
Non-interest expense 283 872,726 1,440,134 8,131 8,348,999  
Panel B: Big four banks:   Obs Mean Std. Error Minimum Maximum
Deposits 56 78,631,183 34,541,815 27,577,499 191,000,000
Employees 56 38,552 6,608 22,500 50,366
Housing loans 56 18,759,232 9,994,634 4,370,841 47,679,000
Loans 56 81,615,712 38,934,619 26,445,398 208,000,000
Non-interest income 56 2,124,322 1,125,816 626,499 6,522,999
Off balance sheet activity 52 41,359,625 19,934,037 5,510,000 96,141,000
Equity capital 56 8,674,520 4,393,153 2,491,899 23,556,999
Interest income 56 9,281,054 2,835,641 4,902,799 19,918,999
Interest expense 56 5,834,337 2,030,585 3,103,399 12,958,999
Investments 56 14,866,742 6,556,399 6,403,099 45,165,999
Non-interest expense 56 3,450,101 1,160,910 1,799,699 8,348,999  
Panel C: Other domestic b Obs Mean Std.  Error MinimumMaximum
Deposits 134 6,803,024 7,403,338 267,770 37,853,918
Employees 134 2,242 2,368 45 11,495
Housing loans 139 2,544,646 3,461,435 0 20,300,100
Loans 134 6,655,576 7,763,194 188,471 39,698,998
Non-interest income 133 233,326 565,918 1,678 4,331,999
Off balance sheet activity 119 1,392,368 1,877,616 0 9,826,000
Equity capital 157 597,805 815,295 21,999 3,858,999
Interest income 133 763,401 764,347 46,361 3,310,999
Interest expense 133 538,757 550,861 6,150 2,457,599
Investments 134 1,932,073 3,369,209 54,484 29,246,999
Non-interest expense 131 334,516 574,008 22,322 4,260,999  21 
Panel D: Foreign banks   Obs Mean Std. Error MinimumMaximum
Deposits 144 1,657,115 2,037,772 2,607 12,322,799
Employees 151 644 788 43 3,311
Housing loans 166 414,926 1,093,813 0 6,386,400
Loans 144 2,069,206 2,564,837 295,810 16,633,098
Non-interest income 132 65,217 107,813 2,121 580,545
Off balance sheet activity 133 699,486 893,698 5,772 5,086,258
Equity capital 151 258,060 304,297 21,999 1,576,768
Interest income 135 271,368 276,123 31,235 1,344,199
Interest expense 133 211,849 198,942 21,494 947,099
Investments 144 769,886 914,925 2,700 5,051,665
Non-interest expense 96 103,689 111,618 8,131 568,217  
Note: All values in $A,000 except Employees. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Stochastic frontier results 
The results for each of the models of bank efficiency are summarized in Table 4, with 
the correlations between the models also shown in Table 4. The results are consistent 
with Sturm and Williams (2004), in that the correlations between Models 1, 1a and 1b 
are highest, while the correlations with Model 2 are lower. The average estimated 
efficiency of between 82 per cent and 86 per cent is marginally higher than found by 
Sturm and Williams (2004) for their DEA estimates, which would be accounted by 
the differences in technique and small differences in sample.
7 The overall pattern of 
efficiency estimates is similar to Sturm and Williams (2004) in that the Foreign Banks 
are most efficient early in the sample period, with the Big Four and Other Domestic 
Bank being more efficient in the aftermath of the recession of the early 1990s. Unlike 
Sturm and Williams (2004) the Other Domestic Banks are less frequently the most 
efficient bank group on average. What is also interesting about these results is that 
while on average the foreign banks are less efficient than the domestic banks over the 
entire sample period, a foreign bank represented the highest measured efficiency for 
each of the four models of efficiency, although not the same foreign bank for each 
                                                 
7  The sample employed in this study includes two additional observations for the Other 
Domestic Banks and 5 additional observations for the Foreign Banks. 22 
model. This result would tend to support the limited global advantage hypothesis of 
Berger et al (2000). The parent characteristics data is shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 4: Average efficiency scores 






























































Model 1 280 0.83 0.12 0.24 0.96 125 0.80 0.17 0.24 0.96
Model 1a 261 0.83 0.09 0.51 0.96 112 0.83 0.11 0.51 0.96
Model 1b 280 0.86 0.08 0.51 0.97 125 0.85 0.10 0.51 0.97
Model 2 272 0.87 0.10 0.16 0.97 85 0.85 0.13 0.16 0.97
Foreign Banks All Banks
 































































Model 1 280 0.70 0.63 -0.03 125 0.74 0.68 -0.15
Model 1a 261 261 0.61 -0.01 112 112 0.64 -0.16
Model 1b 280 261 280 -0.08 125 112 125 -0.17
Model 2 232 221 232 272 78 73 78 85
Foreign Banks All Banks
 
Note: See Table 1 for model descriptions. 
 23 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics: Parent Characteristics, Observations \ Correlation 
 Obs Mean Std.Err. Min Max   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29)
(1) Efficiency Model 1 125 0.80 0.17 0.24 0.96 125 0.74 0.68 -0.15 -0.27 0.25 -0.18 -0.28 -0.15 0.15 0.06 0.15 -0.13 -0.12 -0.21 0.10 -0.14 0.11 0.15 -0.03 0.19 0.05 0.07 -0.27 0.28 -0.51 -0.16 0.19 -0.11
(2) Efficiency Model 1a 112 0.83 0.11 0.51 0.96 112 112 0.64 -0.16 -0.16 0.16 -0.27 -0.25 -0.14 0.06 -0.02 0.16 -0.21 0.09 -0.03 0.19 -0.16 0.13 0.18 -0.08 -0.10 0.13 0.06 -0.21 0.20 -0.23 0.03 0.25 -0.01
(3) Efficiency Model 1b 125 0.85 0.10 0.51 0.97 125 112 125 -0.17 -0.34 0.26 -0.01 -0.31 -0.33 0.18 0.17 -0.18 -0.09 -0.07 -0.21 0.14 -0.34 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.18 -0.13 0.11 -0.25 0.22 -0.39 -0.11 0.23 -0.12
(4) Efficiency Model 2 85 0.85 0.13 0.16 0.97 78 73 78 85 0.06 -0.31 -0.09 0.19 0.05 -0.13 -0.10 0.04 0.01 -0.18 0.13 -0.17 -0.03 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.16 -0.34
(5) Home Return on Assets 132 0.63 0.62 -1.66 3.02 125 112 125 85 132 -0.34 -0.15 0.29 -0.02 -0.36 -0.17 0.27 -0.33 0.14 0.15 0.23 0.19 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.39 0.10 0.18 0.34 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.16
(6) Home Nation Investment Income 127 -0.43 1.74 -3.53 2.34 120 108 120 82 127 127 -0.13 -0.74 -0.27 -0.13 0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.20 -0.55 0.24 -0.21 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.04 -0.13 -0.03 -0.14 -0.33 0.01
(7) Log(Relative GDP per capita) 132 0.14 0.48 -2.52 0.72 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 0.13 -0.11 0.52 0.41 -0.21 0.75 0.00 -0.07 -0.21 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.10 0.44 -0.83 -0.19 0.13 -0.24 0.16 -0.08 -0.04 0.01
(8) Competitor Market share 132 0.58 0.08 0.46 0.71 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 0.36 0.14 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.44 -0.47 0.23 -0.15 -0.15 -0.13 -0.02 0.09 -0.14 0.22 0.11 -0.04 0.03 0.32 0.12
(9) Ranked Home Credit Rating 109 97.38 54.74 16.00 183.50 102 95 102 72 109 107 109 109 109 -0.25 -0.26 0.40 0.12 0.13 0.44 -0.24 0.55 -0.08 -0.36 0.00 -0.17 0.20 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.41 0.31 -0.01 -0.08
(10) Log(Home Assets) (Avg. Annual Ex Rate) 132 12.13 1.04 9.04 14.04 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 0.52 -0.23 0.54 0.14 0.12 -0.37 -0.15 -0.06 0.04 -0.07 0.56 -0.27 -0.48 -0.39 -0.11 -0.04 -0.16 -0.01 0.22
(11) Log(Home Capital) (Avg. Annual Ex. Rate) 127 9.44 1.10 6.79 12.71 120 107 120 83 127 122 127 127 104 127 127 -0.43 0.49 0.06 -0.19 0.07 -0.36 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.49 -0.25 0.09 -0.33 -0.35 0.01 -0.32 -0.09 0.14
(12) Home Net Interest Margin 121 2.52 1.37 -1.62 4.93 116 105 116 78 121 117 121 121 103 121 116 121 -0.46 0.05 0.37 -0.11 0.35 0.11 0.02 0.00 -0.68 0.00 -0.11 0.02 0.36 0.32 0.67 -0.03 -0.13
(13) Trade with Australia  as a share of GDP 129 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06 122 109 122 82 129 127 129 129 107 129 124 118 129 0.11 -0.03 -0.09 -0.11 -0.17 -0.23 -0.11 0.76 0.00 -0.25 -0.23 -0.61 0.32 -0.34 -0.21 -0.18
(14) Home nation capital flow 128 1.28 1.27 -0.67 6.05 121 108 121 81 128 126 128 128 106 128 123 117 128 128 0.55 0.13 0.20 -0.09 -0.20 -0.08 -0.14 0.00 -0.22 -0.13 0.10 0.30 0.33 0.26 0.17
(15) Home nation capital stock 129 21.87 12.70 0.75 57.06 122 109 122 82 129 127 129 129 107 129 124 118 129 128 129 -0.27 0.42 -0.19 -0.35 -0.15 -0.37 0.00 -0.37 -0.22 0.49 0.38 0.77 0.38 -0.12
(16) GDP per capita relative  to Aust GDP per capita 132 -0.30 2.61 -6.37 9.06 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 -0.19 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.01 0.59 -0.06 -0.16 0.02 -0.13 -0.07 -0.02
(17) Experience in Aust. 132 19.50 16.93 0.00 66.00 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 132 -0.13 -0.19 -0.09 -0.25 -0.06 -0.17 0.12 0.25 0.20 0.38 -0.24 -0.01
(18) Dummy Canada 132 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 132 132 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 -0.07 0.11 -0.03 -0.02
(19) Dummy Germany 132 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 132 132 132 -0.02 -0.13 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.15 -0.13 -0.26 -0.06 -0.03
(20) Dummy Hong Kong 132 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 132 132 132 132 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.10 -0.02 -0.01
(21) Dummy Japan 132 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 132 132 132 132 132 -0.09 -0.13 -0.09 -0.40 -0.34 -0.70 -0.15 -0.07
(22) Dummy Jordan 132 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 -0.03 -0.02 -0.10 -0.09 -0.18 -0.04 -0.02
(23) Dummy Singapore 132 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 -0.03 -0.15 -0.13 -0.26 -0.06 -0.03
(24) Dummy Switzerland 132 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 -0.10 -0.09 -0.18 -0.04 -0.02
(25) Dummy UK 132 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 -0.39 0.58 0.37 -0.09
(26) Dummy USA 132 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 0.49 -0.15 -0.07
(27) Dummy English Language 132 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 0.22 -0.15
(28) Dummy Bank WA 132 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 -0.03
(29) Dummy ING 132 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 125 112 125 85 132 127 132 132 109 132 127 121 129 128 129 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
Note: the Australian Bureau of Statistics uses the IMF’s Balance of Payments convention in which income payments abroad are shown with a 
negative sign, a positive sign on investment income would thus indicate income from the home nation to Australia.   24
4.2. Second stage results 
For each model extreme bounds analysis was used to develop the most parsimonious model. This 
model can be considered to the baseline model or the M  vector for this study, and was found to be 
robust to model specification. In the case of Model 1 in Table 6, 2047 alternative specifications of the 
Z  vector were then applied to determine the robustness of the model to alternative specification. In the 
case of each baseline robust model, an additional explanatory variable was then added to the model and 
the extreme bounds approach was repeated. In this case the baseline model was treated as the M  
vector with the additional variable treated as the F  variable of additional interest. The Z  vector of up 
to three additional variables was then added to the model to determine the robustness of this additional 
variable to changes in model specification. In the case of Model 1 in Table 6, this process involved an 
additional 1793 alternative model specifications being considered for each of 22 additional explanatory 
variables. This process was conducted to ensure that the baseline model did not omit any variables with 
additional explanatory power. In each case the baseline model was also estimated as a panel regression 
using random effects estimation, with these results also shown in Table 6.
8 
Table 6: Extreme Bounds Analysis and Robustness Tests 
Panel A: Random Effects Estimation of Base Model
   
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Constant 0.76 19.20 *** 1.11 13.76 *** 0.91 24.33 *** 1.02 15.02 ***
Dummy UK 0.13 1.71 * 0.10 2.13 *
Dummy Bank WA  0.15 2.19 **
Dummy ING -0.39 -2.22
Home Nation Investment Income 0.03 5.24 *** 0.02 3.91 *** -0.04 -3.94 ***
Home Net Interest Margin -0.03 -2.75 ***
Competitor Market Share -0.49 -3.64 ***
Home Nation  Capital Stock -0.01 -3.32 ***
No. Obs. 120 112 112 82
Adj.R2 0.74 0.40 0.60 0.48
Hausman test (Chi^2 statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-test on individual random effects 11.70 *** 2.12 *** 5.07 *** 1.54
Model 1 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2
 
Note: * = significant at the 5% level, ** = significant at the 1% level, *** = significant at the 0.1% 
level. 
                                                 
8 In some cases the parent firm or home nation characteristics were found to be highly correlated with another 
similar variable, such as Home Return on Assets and Home Net Interest Margins.  In these cases the variable that 
exhibited the highest correlation with the estimated efficiency score was included in the Extreme Bounds 
Analysis and the alternative variable was removed in order to reduce potential multicollinearity.   25




















































































































Model 1 (based on 2047 iterations)
Constant -0.637 1.426 91.35 0.991 0.748 0.111
Dummy UK -0.548 0.504 16.56 0.903 0.133 0.094
Home nation Investment Income -0.007 0.056 97.61 0.998 0.028 0.007
Model 1a (based on 2047 iterations)
Constant -0.049 2.043 99.90 1.000 1.089 0.121
Dummy Bank WA  -0.794 1.680 29.90 0.912 0.154 0.120
Competitor Market Share -1.353 0.306 94.58 0.994 -0.487 0.165
Model 1b (based on 1793 iterations)
Constant 0.109 1.498 100.00 1.000 0.907 0.081
Dummy UK  -0.288 0.288 52.09 0.958 0.096 0.052
Home Nation Investment Income -0.006 0.036 96.26 0.995 0.015 0.005
Home Net Interest Margin -0.068 0.029 80.03 0.975 -0.030 0.013
Model 2 (based on 1793 iterations)
Constant -1.953 1.948 84.50 0.947 0.905 0.189
Dummy ING  -1.792 0.556 45.62 0.956 -0.425 0.235
Home Nation Investment Income -0.106 -0.016 100.00 1.000 -0.049 0.012
Home Nation Capital Stock -0.031 0.000 99.94 0.999 -0.011 0.003  
Note: See Table 1 for model descriptions. 
Consistent with Williams (2003), little evidence was found to support the following clients (defensive 
expansion) effect. In the case of Models 1 and 1b, the coefficient for Home Nation Investment Income 
is positive and significant. This variable is measured using the IMF’s balance of payment conventions, 
in that a negative value represents a flow from the host nation (Australia) to the home nation. Given 
this measurement, as income flows from Australia to the home nation reduce, so foreign bank 
efficiency increases.  Given that investment income flows are not necessarily correlated with 
investment flows in a given year, then it is unlikely that this reflects a client following effect. In the 
case of Model 2, as investment income from the host nation to the home nation increase, so the   26
efficiency of the profit creation process increases. This would suggest that these investment income 
flows generate fee income for the foreign banks, potentially via transaction processing and foreign 
exchange services, which is profitable, but that offering services of this type for this purpose is not 
necessarily efficient in terms of physical inputs and outputs.  
Previous Australian studies have found that following clients acts to increase size (Williams, 1998b), 
but not profits (Williams, 2003). This difference may be explained by considering the results for the 
profit-based model of bank efficiency (Model 2), which found bank efficiency in profit creation is 
reduced by following clients as represented by Home Nation Capital Stock. Taken together with the 
results of previous studies, it can be concluded that following clients will increase size and some types 
of efficiency but not profits in the host nation. 
The retail model of bank efficiency (Model 1a) demonstrates the impact of barriers to entry for foreign 
banks, as Competitor Market Share 1 was found to be negative and significant, while a dummy variable 
indicating the Bank of Western Australia was positive and significant. This result is particularly 
interesting as the Bank of Western Australia is the only foreign-owned bank in this study representing 
the acquisition of a domestic retail bank by a foreign bank.
9 Thus, the results for Model 1a indicate that 
for the foreign banks the large market share of the incumbent Big Four banks acted as a significant 
barrier to entry, reducing foreign bank efficiency, consistent with Williams (2003) for foreign bank 
profits. Thus the foreign banks wishing to compete with the incumbent banks operated at a less 
efficient level, indicating the over-use of inputs in order to compete, so reducing efficiency, which was 
particularly apparent in the retail market, where delivery networks are more important than in 
wholesale banking. The results for the Bank of WA confirm the importance of delivery systems, as by 
taking over a regional bank these efficiency costs were reduced and Bank WA with foreign ownership 
was able to operate more efficiently than the other foreign banks, when retail activity is factored into 
the output mix. 
The wholesale model of bank efficiency (Model 1b) found that banks from the United Kingdom are 
more efficient on average. As this result may have represented a cultural or experience effect, a dummy 
variable representing all nations where the main language is English was also t e sted  as w e ll  as a 
measure representing number of years of operation in Australia. Neither of these variables was found to 
be significant in the robustness tests for any model of bank efficiency. Thus, this result for United 
                                                 
9 The acquisition of United Permanent Building Society by the National Mutual Royal Bank (a joint venture 
involving the Royal Bank of Canada) is included in the sample.   27
Kingdom ownership again confirms the limited form of the global advantage hypothesis of Berger et al 
(2000). However, this result does differ from Berger et al (2000) in that no evidence is found of banks 
from the United States displaying higher efficiency.  Instead, these results are closer to those of 
Beccalli (2004). Parent bank profits, as measured by parent NIM, were found to be efficiency reducing 
for Model 1b indicating that parent profitability does not translate into efficiency in the host market. 
Model 2 provides some interesting insights into the following clients effect, with Home Nation Capital 
Stock acting to reduce the efficiency of the process of profit creation. As discussed above this indicates 
that following clients does not increase profits in the host nation. A dummy variable representing ING 
Bank was found to have a significant negative relationship with efficiency as measured by Model 2. 
ING bank proves largely an internet-based banking service, with the sample data for ING covering 
2000 and 2001. This result indicates that a strategy focused upon internet delivery does not improve the 
efficiency of profit creation, especially during the initial phases of internet operation. This is most 




This study has applied parametric distance functions to estimate the efficiency of foreign banks in 
Australia, and then employed extreme bounds analysis to determine a model of foreign bank efficiency 
that is robust to model specification. The limited global advantage hypothesis of Berger et al (2000) is 
supported by this study, with banks from the United Kingdom in particular being found to be more 
efficient than other foreign banks. It is found that following clients does not improve the efficiency of 
transforming inputs into outputs. However, following clients (defensive expansion) reduces the 
efficiency of the process of profit creation in the host nation.  This result provide at least a partial 
explanation for the conclusion of Williams (2002) that following clients increases size but not profits. It 
was also found that the processing of investment income flows from the home nation reduces the 
efficiency of transformation of physical inputs into physical outputs, but that this processing improves 
the efficiency of the profit creation process. The market share of competitor banks, particularly the 
incumbent Big Four banks, acts as a barrier to entry to the retail market resulting in reduced efficiency 
due to the need to over-use inputs in order to compete with the dominant banks. The acquisition of a 
domestic bank reduces the impact of this barrier to entry to the retail market. However, internet 
banking seems to reduce the efficiency of the profit creation process and so this approach does not, in 
this case, offer the reduction in barriers to entry initially anticipated, at least in the startup phases.   28
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